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Abstract
This paper investigates the determinants of a responsible multinational firm’s decision to enter
in a foreign country either through exports or through foreign direct investment (FDI), as well
as the relevant market and societal outcomes. We find that CSR investments are higher under
FDI than under exports. The multinational firm’s incentives to serve the foreign country through
FDI are increasing in the average consumer’s valuation for CSR and in the intensity of the foreign
country’s market competition, but only if the average consumer’s valuation for CSR in this country
is sufficiently high. These incentives are mitigated by the multinational firm’s liability in this country
under exports. We also find that there is misalignment of preferences between the stakeholders of
the two countries over the multinational firm’s mode of entry in the foreign country.
Keywords: Corporate social responsibility; Multinational firms; Foreign direct investment; Ex-
ports; Import tariffs.
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1 Introduction
The core role of multinational firms, through international trade and investment, in home and host coun-
tries has recently given rise to increased attention regarding their social and environmental footprints
by businesses, consumers, investors, policy makers and academics (United Nations, 2014).
In this context, KPMG (2015) suggests that corporate social responsibility (CSR) is now undeniably
a mainstream business practice worldwide with more than 90% of the top 250 companies of the Fortune
Global 500 stating a well-defined CSR strategy and including relevant data in their annual financial re-
ports. Moreover, existing evidence suggests that consumers exhibit increasing trends on their awareness
for the social and environmental consequences of firms’ production and their expectations on firms’ CSR
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activities are expressed through their product, services and equity purchasing decisions (Becchetti et
al., 2011).1 At the same time, the promotion of CSR has become a top priority in the policy agenda for
sustainable development in many countries and international organizations. Interestingly, when CSR
started becoming widespread, its further encouragement became a central policy objective in both the
U.S. and the E.U. (European Commission, 2001; 2006).2,3
Yet, in a global economy context, Campbell et al. (2012) argue that “little research has been done
on the motivations, either strategic or altruistic, behind CSR by multinationals in host countries”.
Kitzmueller and Shimshack (2012) also suggest that the field of international CSR warrants greater
attention while the preferences and politics that motivate CSR differ substantively across countries.
The present paper has been motivated by the growing importance of multinational firms’ CSR
practices and their subsequent outcomes. The paper addresses the following questions: How does a
multinational firm’s mode of entry in a foreign country affect the level of its CSR investments? How
do CSR investments affect market and societal outcomes in the foreign country? What determines a
multinational firm’s decision to export to or to activate a branch plant in a foreign country? Which is
the most beneficial mode of entry in the foreign country for each relevant stakeholder?
To address the above questions, we consider two firms located in different countries. One of the firms
(the multinational), besides serving its home country’s market, plans to serve the foreign country’s too,
either through exports or through establishing a FDI there. If the multinational chooses to export, it
faces the “liability of foreignness” (Campbell et al., 2012) and the exported quantity is subject to a tariff
set by the foreign country’s government. Alternatively, the FDI in the foreign country incurs a fixed
set-up cost. The multinational firm has the option to follow a “doing well by doing good” strategy,
through integrating social and environmental concerns in its business operations, and invest in CSR
activities along the value chain (Porter and Kramer, 2011) “above and beyond” that mandated by the
foreign country’s government (Campbell et al., 2012). This strategy meets the preferences of socially
conscious consumers for responsible goods whose production processes comply with criteria for social
and environmental sustainability (Becchetti et al., 2011).4
The core contribution of this paper is that it sheds some light to the relative costs and benefits of
CSR activities as driving factors of a multinational firm’s decision to serve a foreign country’s market
through exports or FDI as well as the relevant market and societal outcomes. Our main findings suggest
1Manasakis et al. (2013) cite evidence from manufacturing industries, tourism services and agricultural production
suggesting that consumers express a willingness to pay a premium for goods and services produced by socially responsible
firms. McWilliams and Siegel (2011) cite evidence supporting that investors reward socially responsible firms.
2Although their main objective is the same, Doh and Guay (2006) argue that “different institutional structures and
political legacies in the U.S. and E.U. are important factors in explaining how governments, NGOs, and the broader policy
determine and implement preferences regarding CSR in these two important world regions”.
3The OECD Guidelines for multinational enterprises (OECD, 2011) offer government-backed recommendations covering
business conduct in a wide variety of areas, including employment and industrial relations, human rights, disclosure of
financial and non-financial information, environmental issues.
4 In the terminology of Porter and Kramer (2011), CSR activities connect company success with social progress and
constitute a profit center for firms while creating value, and for society, by addressing needs and challenges of the firm’s
stakeholders, such as its employees (investments in health and safety in the workplace), suppliers (support to local suppliers
rather than cheaper alternative sources), and the environment (reduction on emissions of pollutants; use of environmentally
friendly technologies).
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that under both exports and FDI, the multinational firm’s CSR investments increase its equilibrium
output and profits as well as consumer surplus and total welfare. Moreover, these investments are
higher under FDI than under exports because of the “liability of foreignness” in the latter case. The
multinational firm’s incentives to serve the foreign country through FDI are strengthened by the average
consumer’s valuation for CSR as well as by the intensity of the foreign country’s market competition,
but only if the average consumer’s valuation for CSR in this country is sufficiently high. These incentives
are mitigated by the multinational’s liability in the foreign country. Interestingly, assuming that within
each country, the firm, consumers and the policy maker are the related stakeholders, we find that their
preferences for the multinational firm’s mode of entry in the foreign country are not aligned, leaving
space for lobbying over trade and/or industrial policies affecting business conduct.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the model and in Section 3 we study
the multinational firm’s possible modes of entry in the foreign country’s market. Section 4 investigates
the multinational firm’s decision between exports and FDI. In Section 5, a number of extensions of our
basic model are briefly discussed. Section 6 concludes.
2 The Model
We consider two countries, denoted H (home) and F (foreign), and two firms, denoted 1 and 2. Initially,
firm 1 is located in countryH and firm 2 resides in country F . Firm 1, besides serving its home country’s
market, plans to serve the foreign country’s too either through exports (e) or through establishing a
FDI (f) in a production “branch-plant” facility in country F . Hence, firm 1 chooses one mode m = e, f
, e = f , in order to to become “multinational”. Firm 2 serves country F ’s market solely. Following
the seminal analysis of Brander and Krugman (1983), as well as most models of intra-industry trade in
identical commodities, we adopt the segmented market hypothesis, i.e., each firm regards each country
as a separate market and chooses the profit-maximising quantity for each market separately.
Consumers in the foreign country’s market are socially and environmentally conscious and have
preferences for responsible products. Independently of the mode that the multinational firm will choose
for serving country F ’s market, this firm plans to meet these preferences through a “doing well by doing
good” strategy, i.e., through investing in CSR activities along its value chain (Porter and Kramer, 2011)
“above and beyond” that mandated by the foreign country’s government (Campbell et al., 2012).5
On the demand side, following Garella and Petrakis (2008), Manasakis et al. (2013) and Liu et al.
(2015), the utility function of the representative consumer in country I = H,F is:
UI = (a+ λmkIsIi)qIi + (a+ λmkIsIj )qIj −
q2Ii + q
2
Ij + 2γqIiqIj
2
+ eI (1)
Putting sH1 = 0, since the multinational firm does not invest in CSR in country H, and qH2 = 0,
since firm 2 does not serve country H’s market, gives the representative consumer’s utility function in
5We consider that the multinational firm invests in CSR activities only for serving the foreign country’s market because
we focus to the strategic use of CSR. It can be shown that even if the multinational firm invests in CSR activities in its
home market too, the results are qualitatively similar.
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country H: UH = aqH1 − q2H1/2 + eH .
Putting sF2 = 0, since firm 2 does not invest in CSR, gives the respective utility function in country
F : UF = (a+ λmkF sF1)qF1 + aqF2 − 12(q2F1 + q2F2 + 2γqF1qF2) + eF .
qIi , i, j = 1, 2, i = j, represents product i’s quantity bought by the representative consumer
in country I and eI is the respective quantity of the “composite good” in country I. This good’s
quantity and price are normalized to unity. The parameter γ ∈ (0, 1] is a measure of the degree of
substitutability, with γ → 0 (γ = 1) corresponding to the case of almost independent (homogeneous)
goods. Alternatively, γ may represent market competition’s intensity, with a higher γ declaring fiercer
competition.
sF1 ≥ 0 represents the level of CSR investments undertaken by the multinational firm in country
F , which, in turn, increase by λmkF sF1 the consumers’ valuation for this firm’s responsible product.
kF ∈ [0, 1] represents the increase of the average consumer’s willingness to pay for the multinational
firm’s product per unit of its CSR investment.
The parameter λm captures the “liability of foreignness” that the multinational firm faces in coun-
try F . Following Campbell et al. (2012), the “liability of foreignness” argument suggests that if a
multinational serves a foreign country through exports, consumers may be sceptical because they lack
information about this firm’s level of CSR investments and the ensuing social and environmental foot-
print of its products. The latter will then hamper this firm’s performance in the foreign country. In
this context, we argue that the multinational firm can overcome the liability of foreignness and improve
its social legitimacy in country F through establishing a FDI in this country. In this case, i.e., when
m = f , its CSR activities are perfectly verifiable by consumers and we normalize the multinational’s
liability to λf = 1. On the contrary, if the multinational serves the foreign country thought exports, i.e.,
when m = e, then λe = λ ∈ [0, 1), with λ→ 0 (λ→ 1) corresponds to the case of low (high) legitimacy
in country F , i.e., the liability of foreignness is increasing in λ.
Maximization of (1) with respect to qIi and qIj gives the inverse demand function:
PIi = a+ λmkIsIi − qIi − γqIj (2)
Putting sH1 = 0 and qH2 = 0 gives firm 1’s inverse demand function in country H: PH1 = a− qH1 .
Putting sF2 = 0 gives firm i’s inverse demand function in country F : PF1 = a+λmkF sF1−qF1−γqF2
and PF2 = a− qF2 − γqF1 .
The multinational firm’s inverse demand PF1 is positively affected by its CSR investments and their
valuation by the average consumer in country F . This reflects a core idea of our model, that is, socially
conscious consumers’ valuation for a product increases with the multinational firm’s CSR investment
level. This, in turn, increases the demand for this firm’s product.
We consider that both firms are endowed with identical constant returns to scale production technolo-
gies and the unit production cost, denoted by c, is the same for both firms. Regarding the multinational
firm’s CSR investments, we consider that a higher CSR level increases, at an increasing rate, its unit
cost.6 More specifically, for a given CSR effort level sF1 , the multinational firm’s unit cost is constant
6Manasakis et al. (2014) cite evidence according to which an individual firm’s level of CSR activities, such as improv-
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and equal to c(1 + s2F1).
The multinational firm’s cost is further increased by Cm, depending on the mode that this firm
will choose for serving country F ’s market. If m = e, the multinational firm pays a tariff re per
unit of the exported quantity, which has been set by the foreign country’s government. Hence, Ce =
reqF1. Following the terminology of Motta and Norman (1996), r
e is an inverse measure of “market
accessibility” and policy changes that increase re “heighten the asymmetry” between firms 1 and 2.7
Alternatively, if m = f , the FDI in country F incurs a fixed set-up cost T , containing the transaction
and construction costs necessary to open a subsidiary in this country (Naylor and Santoni, 2003). Hence,
Cf = T .
The multinational firm’s profits can then be expressed as:
Πm1 = ΠH1 +Π
m
F1 = PH1qH1 +
[
PF1 − c(1 + s2F1)
]
qF1 −Cm (3)
Regarding the tariff re, we make the following assumption:
Assumption 1: reC < r
e
C : =
1
2
[
(2− γ) (a− c) + λ2k2F2c
]
Assumption 1 requires that the tariff re is not too high and is a necessary and sufficient condition
in order to avoid non-existence of pure strategy equilibria and guarantee interior solutions under all
circumstances.8
Regarding the fixed set-up cost T , we make the following assumption:
Assumption 2: TC < TC : =
[2(2−γ)(a−c)c+k2F ]
2
[2c(γ2−4)]2
Assumption 2 guarantees interior solutions under all circumstances too.
The profit function for firm 2 is given by:
Π2 = PF2qF2 (4)
In this context, we consider the following game with observable actions. In the first stage of the
game, the foreign country’s government determines its tariff so as to maximize national total welfare. In
the second stage, the multinational firm decides whether to serve the foreign country’s market through
exports or FDI and in the following stage it invests in CSR. In the fourth stage of the game, the two
firms set their quantities. The game structure reflects a ranking of decisions in terms of flexibility. It
is normal to postulate that the multinational’s mode of entry in the foreign country is decided given
ing working conditions for employees, buying more expensive inputs from local suppliers, financing recycling and other
socially responsible campaigns or introducing “green” technologies, has an increasingly negative impact on the firm’s unit
production costs.
7Moreover, the commodity exported is subject to a constant transportation unit cost, which, following Fumagalli (2003)
and without loss of generality, is normalized to zero. This assumption allows us to economize with the parameters of the
model that create unnecessary analytical complications without qualitatively altering our results.
8As in Bughin and Vannini (2003), we restrict our analysis to the case where both firms produce a strictly positive
quantity in equilibrium. The case of monopoly is purposely neglected here, since we want to focus on the strategic
interactions arising in duopoly.
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this country’s policy. We solve the game by employing the Subgame Perfect Nash Equilibrium (SPNE)
solution concept.
3 The multinational firm serves the foreign country’s market
In the fourth stage of the game, each firm i chooses its output to maximize its profits given by (3) and
(4) respectively. From the first-order condition, each firm’s reaction function in country F is given by:
∂Πm1
∂qF1
= RmF1(qF2) =
1
2
[
a− c− γqF2 + sF1(λmkF − csF1)−C
′
m
]
(5)
∂Π2
∂qF2
= RF2(qF1) =
1
2
(a− c− γqF1) (6)
Regarding the multinational firm’s reaction function, the following observations are in order: First,
the term sF1(λmkF − csF1) captures the opposing effects of the multinational firm’s CSR investments:
An increase in CSR investment by sF1 increases the demand for its product by λmkF and its unit cost
by csF1 . Second,
∂RmF1
∂sF1
= 12
(
λmkF − 2csF1
)
suggests that the multinational firm’s best response output
has an inverted U-shaped relation with its CSR efforts, with the maximum attained at sF1 =
λmkF
2c .
Intuitively, for a relatively low level of CSR efforts (sF1 <
λmkF
2c ), the positive demand effect dominates
the negative unit cost effect and RmF1shifts outwards. The opposite holds for sF1 >
λmkF
2c . Third, the fact
that C
′
f =
∂Cf
∂qF1
= 0 while C
′
e =
∂Ce
∂qF1
= re suggests that, compared with the FDI case, the multinational
firm faces a relatively higher unit cost when it serves country F ’s market through exports.
The first-order condition of ΠH1 determines that the multinational firm’s output in country H is
qH1 =
a−c
2 . Solving the system of R
m
F1
(qF2) and RF2(qF1) we obtain each firm’s output in country F :
qmF1 =
(2− γ) (a− c) + 2
[
sF1
(
λmkF − 2csF1
)−C ′m
]
4− γ2 (7)
qmF2 =
(2− γ) (a− c)− γ
[
sF1
(
λmkF − csF1
)−C′m
]
4− γ2 (8)
These output levels highlight the multinational firm’s comparative advantage in the foreign country.
More specifically, this firm’s output increases: (i) in its CSR investment level, but only if sF1 is relatively
low; (ii) in the average consumer’s willingness to pay for its product, i.e.,
dqm
F1
dkF
> 0; and (iii) in its liability
in the foreign country, i.e.,
dqmF1
dλm
> 0. On the contrary, the multinational’s output decreases in the tariff
rate, i.e.,
dqmF1
dre < 0. The opposites hold for firm 2.
In the third stage, the multinational firm invests in CSR efforts in order to maximize its profits
ΠmF1 =
(
qmF1
)2
. The corresponding equilibrium CSR investments are smF1 =
λmkF
2c . We observe that
dsm
F1
dkF
> 0,
dsm
F1
dλm
> 0 and
dsm
F1
dc < 0 always hold, implying that the multinational’s CSR effort increases in
the average consumer’s willingness to pay for its product, in its liability in country F , as well as in the
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efficiency of the CSR (and output) “production technology” (captured by a lower c).
Note that uF (
kF
a ,
c
a) =
kF√
c(a−c)
= kF /a√
c/a(1−c/a)
is a measure of the average consumer’s valuation for
CSR activities per unit of the foreign country’s market size (adjusted for unit cost relative to market
size, ca). Moreover, uF is increasing in
kF
a and it is U-shaped in
c
a reaching its minimum value
2kF
a
at c = a2 . Its maximum value is equal to 1. Hence, the multinational firm’s CSR investments can be
rewritten as:
smF1 =
uFλm
√
(a− c)c
2c
(9)
Consider that the multinational firm chooses, in the second stage of the game, to serve the foreign
country’s market through FDI. Therefore, using sfF1 =
uF
√
(a−c)c
2c in (7) and (8), we obtain firm i’s
equilibrium output in country F :
qfF1 =
(2γ − u2F − 4) (a− c)
2(γ2 − 4) ; q
f
F2
=
[(
u2F + 4
)
γ − 8] (a− c)
4(γ2 − 4) (10)
Then, firm 2’s profits are ΠfF2 =
(
qfF2
)2
and the multinational firm’s profits are ΠH1 = (qH1)
2 and
ΠfF1 =
(
qfF1
)2
− T .
Consider now that the multinational firm chooses to serve the foreign country’s market through
exports. In this case, it holds that seF1 =
uFλ
√
(a−c)c
2c and in the first stage of the game, the foreign
country’s government determines its tariff rate re so as to maximize national total welfare:
TW eF (r
e) = CSeF (r
e) + ΠeF2(r
e) + reqeF1(r
e) (11)
The socially optimal tariff rate is re = 112
[
4 (α− c) + λ2k2Fc
]
which is rewritten as:
re =
1
12
(α− c) (4 + λ2u2F ) (12)
and is increasing in the multinational firm’s liability in country F and in the average consumer’s
valuation for CSR activities.
Using re in (7) and (8), we obtain firm i’s equilibrium output in country F :
qeF1 =
(3γ − λ2u2F − 4) (a− c)
3(γ2 − 4) ; q
e
F2 =
[(
λ2u2F + 4
)
γ − 12] (a− c)
6(γ2 − 4) (13)
Hence, regarding country F , the multinational firm’s profits are ΠeF1 =
(
qeF1
)2
and firm 2’s profits
are ΠeF2 =
(
qeF2
)2
. The multinational firm’s profits in country H are ΠH1 = (qH1)
2.
Consumer surplus in country H is CSH =
1
2 (qH1)
2, i.e., it is independent from the mode that
the multinational firm chooses for serving country F ’s market. On the contrary, consumer surplus in
country F is CSmF =
1
2
[
(qmF1)
2 + (qmF2)
2 + 2γqmF1q
m
F2
]
. Country H’s total welfare is TW fH = CSH +ΠH1
and TW eH = CSH +ΠH1 +Π
e
F1
under FDI and exports respectively. The corresponding total welfare in
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country F is TW fF = CS
f
F +Π
f
F2
+ΠfF1 and TW
e
F = CS
e
F +Π
e
F2
+ reqeF1.
9
Compared with a benchmark scenario where no firm invests in CSR, it can be shown that the
multinational firm’s CSR investments increase its output and profits as well as consumer surplus and
total welfare in country F .10
4 Comparing FDI and exports
Regarding the multinational firm’s two modes of entry in the foreign country, the following Proposition
summarizes:
Proposition 1 (i) The multinational firm’s CSR investments are always higher under FDI than under
exports, i.e., sfF1 > s
e
F1
.
(ii) Under both exports and FDI, the multinational firm’s CSR investments increase (decrease) its
(firm 2’s) equilibrium output and profits as well as consumer surplus and total welfare in the foreign
country.
(iii) The tariff, the multinational firm’s equilibrium CSR effort, output and profits, as well as con-
sumer surplus and total welfare in the foreign country increase in the average consumer’s willingness to
pay in this country (higher kF ), in the multinational’s liability (higher λm) and in the efficiency of the
CSR “production technology” (lower c).
Regarding the first part of Proposition 1, it is a direct consequence from the fact that when the
multinational firm serves country F ’s market through FDI, its CSR activities are perfectly verifiable
by consumers, i.e., there is no liability of foreignness. The second part of Proposition 1 highlights
the market and societal effects of CSR activities. In this context, the multinational firm’s quantity
in the foreign country is always higher under FDI than under exports, i.e., qfF1 > q
e
F1
. This holds for
two reasons: Compared to the case of exports, under FDI, the multinational firm avoids the import
tariff as well as it benefits from its perfect liability in the foreign country with sfF1 > s
e
F1
. Strategic
substitutability suggests that qeF2 > q
f
F2
and ΠeF2 > Π
f
F2
, implying that firm 2 prefers the multinational
firm to serve country F through FDI always. Yet, the increase of the multinational firm’s output
dominates and total quantity supplied in country F is always higher under FDI than under exports,
i.e., qfF > q
e
F .
Turning our attention to the second stage of the game, we find that the multinational firm chooses to
serve the foreign country’s market through FDI, if T < T e =
[9(u2F−2γ+4)−4(λ
2u2F−3γ+4)](a−c)
2
36(4−γ2)2
. Regarding
this critical level of sunk cost, the following observations are in order: First, dT
e
dλ < 0 implies that as the
multinational’s liability in the foreign country increases, its exports increase too, recall that
dqeF1
dλ > 0,
and its incentives for FDI are mitigated. Second, dT
e
duF
> 0 suggests that consumers’ valuation for CSR
increases the multinational’s CSR investments, output, profits and the maximum affordable set-up cost
9The analytical expressions for the equilibrium consumer surplus and total welfare are available from the authors upon
request.
10Because of space limitations, the full analysis of this benchmark scenario and its comparison with the present cases
are available from the authors upon request.
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that this firm can pay for FDI in the foreign country. This, in turn, strengthens (mitigates) its incentives
for FDI (exports). Third, dT
e
dγ > 0, if and only if mB >
√
9γ2−20γ+12
2γλ2+3γ
, i.e., the average consumer’s
valuation for CSR in country F is sufficiently high. In this case, the gains due to the multinational’s
higher CSR efforts under FDI compensate for the losses due to fierce market competition in country F ,
which, in turn, strengthens this firm’s incentives for FDI independently of the liability of its exports in
the foreign country. The following Proposition summarizes:
Proposition 2 (i) The multinational firm will choose to serve the foreign country’s market through
FDI, if and only if the sunk cost for the establishment of a production plant in the foreign country is
sufficiently low, i.e., T < T e(uF , γ, λ).
(ii) The multinational firm’s incentives to serve the foreign country through FDI are mitigated in
its liability in this country under exports and strengthened: (a) in the average consumer’s valuation
for CSR, (b) in the intensity of market competition in the foreign country, if and only if the average
consumer’s valuation for CSR in this country is sufficiently high.
(iii) Firm 2 prefers the multinational firm to serve country F through FDI always.
Let us now focus on the relative welfare effects of the multinational firm’s modes for serving country
F ’s market. First of all, recal that consumer surplus in country H, i.e., CSH =
1
2 (qH1)
2, is indepen-
dent from the mode that the multinational firm chooses for serving country F ’s market. By contrast,
consumer surplus in country F is always higher under FDI than under exports, i.e., CSfF > CS
e
F .
Intuitively, this is because the relatively higher CSR investments under FDI result to relatively higher
total quantity supplied in country F under FDI than under exports.
Total welfare in country H is always higher under exports than under FDI, i.e., TW eH > TW
f
H . This
suggests that the policy maker in the home country could take measures to promote the multinational’s
exports of socially and environmentally responsible products. In this context, this policy maker could
introduce an industrial policy subsidizing exports, with the maximum subsidy being equal to ΠeF1 . Total
welfare in country F is higher under FDI than under exports, i.e., TW fF > TW
e
F , if T < T
f (uF , γ, λ),
with T f > T e.11 Intuitively, consumer surplus in country F is relatively higher under FDI, because
sfF1 > s
e
F1
, and firm 2’s profits are relatively higher under exports. We find that the multinational firm’s
profits in country F under FDI exceed this country’s tariff revenues under exports, i.e., ΠfF1 > r
eqeF1 , if
T < T f (uF , γ, λ). The analysis reveals an interesting trade-off: When the multinational firm chooses
to serve the foreign country’s market through FDI, this country’s policy maker loses the policy option
to charge a tariff. Yet, in the FDI case, this country’s total welfare increases because of the perfect
verification of the multinational firm’s CSR activities and its subsequent increase in quantity. The
welfare effects of the multinational firm’s mode to serve country F relates our analysis with the OECD
(2011) guidelines for multinational enterprises which provide non-binding principles and standards for
responsible business conduct aiming to contribute towards economic, environmental and social progress
to home and host countries. The following Proposition summarizes:
11The analytical expression of T f (uF , γ, λ) is available from the authors upon request.
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Proposition 3 (i) Consumer surplus in the multinational firm’s home country is independent from
this firm’s mode of entry in the foreign country.
(ii) Total welfare in the multinational firm’s home country is always higher under exports than under
FDI.
(iii) Consumer surplus in the foreign country is always higher under FDI than under exports.
(iv) Total welfare in the foreign country is higher under FDI than under exports if and only if
T < T f (uF , γ, λ).
Based on the above analysis, two further observations are in order: First, independently of the
multinational firm’s mode of entry in the foreign country, CSR is welfare enhancing and policy makers
should take measures to promote CSR activities, e.g. by raising consumers’ awareness on social and
environmental issues; building capacities for CSR; improving disclosure, transparency and the quality of
CSR reports; facilitating socially responsible investments (Steurer, 2010).12 Second, the stakeholders’
preferences for the multinational firm’s mode of entry in the foreign country are not aligned. More
specifically, assuming that within each country, the firm, consumers and the policy maker are the
related stakeholders, we find that firm 2 and country H’s policy maker prefer the multinational to serve
country F through exports always. Country H’s consumers are indifferent but country F ’s consumers
prefer the establishment of the FDI in their country. Firm 1 and country F ’s policy maker prefer this
FDI if and only if its sunk cost is relatively low. These observations reveal that there is space for
lobbying over trade and/or industrial policies affecting the mode of entry of responsible multinational
firms in foreign countries.
5 Extensions - Discussion
We now discuss briefly two modifications of our model and discuss our results.
Total welfare under FDI: Consider that the multinational firm’s profits in the foreign country are
repatriated to this firm’s home country, instead of being counted in the foreign country’s total welfare.
In this scenario, total welfare is TW ftH = CSH +ΠH1 +Π
f
F1
−T and TW ftF = CSfF +ΠfF2 for country H
and F respectively. We find that total welfare in country H is higher under FDI than under exports,
i.e., TW ftH > TW
e
H , if and only if T < T
e. Moreover, total welfare in country F is always lower under
FDI than under exports.
Both firms invest in CSR: Consider that firm 2 invests in CSR too, with its investment level
sF2 increasing by kF sF2 the consumers’ valuation for this firm’s product and hence, PF2 = a+ kF sF2 −
qF2 − γqF1. In this scenario, the multinational firm’s CSR investments do not change, while its (firm
2’s) output and profits are relatively lower (higher) than the respective when only the multinational
firm invests in CSR. Country F ’s consumer surplus and total welfare are relatively higher when both
12This is in line with the policy initiatives of the European Commission (2011): “...the Commission will step up its
cooperation with Member States, partner countries and relevant international fora to promote respect for internationally
recognised principles and guidelines, and to foster consistency between them. This approach also requires EU enterprises
to renew their efforts to respect such principles and guidelines.”
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firms invest in CSR. The above hold for FDI and exports, highlight the beneficial effects of CSR for
consumers and firms and strengthen the arguments for policy measures tp promote the disclosure of
CSR activities.
In this context, the Directive 2014/95/EU (European Union, 2014) concerns the disclosure of non-
financial information by certain large companies across Europe through statements containing informa-
tion relating to at least environmental matters, social and employee-related matters, respect for human
rights, anti-corruption and bribery matters. This Directive meets the needs of investors and stakehold-
ers for information about the societal and environmental footprint of businesses and has its origins to
European Commission (2011) arguing that public authorities should play a supporting role through a
smart mix of voluntary CSR policy measures and complementary regulation for corporate accountabil-
ity. Interestingly, KPMG (2015) suggests that European companies are leaders in the quality of their
non-financial information disclosured within a growing worldwide regulations requiring companies to
publish non-financial information.
Despite the growing importance and stylized facts about CSR activities of multinational firms, the
relevant literature is still scant. In Wang et al. (2012) and Chang et al. (2014), each firm has the option
for a consumer-friendly initiative, constituted by own profit and by consumer surplus maximization.
Becchetti et al. (2011) consider competition between a not-for-profit fair trader and a profit-maximizing
producer in a standard Hotelling framework with heterogeneous consumers regarding their preferences
on CSR. We depart from these papers in three dimensions. First, besides exports, we also consider that
the multinational firm can serve the foreign country’s market through FDI. Second, the present paper
treats CSR efforts as a certain for-profit strategic variable of the multinational firm, instead of a fair
consumer-friendly initiative. Third, we study how does the intensity of market competition, captured
by the degree of product differentiation, affects market and societal outcomes.
The recent literature regarding a multinational firm’s mode of entry in a foreign country studies
the role of vertically related markets (Ishikawa and Horiuchi, 2012), the impact of technology licensing
(Sinha, 2010) and the conditions for the coexistence of FDI and exports (Ma and Zhou, 2016). Yet,
none of these papers considers that the multinational firm invests in CSR.
6 Conclusion
We have investigated the determinants of a responsible multinational firm’s decision to enter in a foreign
country either through exports or through FDI as well as the relevant market and societal outcomes. Our
main finding is that the multinational firm, seeking for a competitive advantage in the foreign market,
strategically engages in CSR activities and meets the socially conscious consumers’ demand. CSR
investments are higher in the case of FDI than under exports and the multinational firm’s incentives to
serve the foreign country through FDI increase with the average consumer’s valuation for CSR and with
the intensity of the foreign country’s market competition, but only if the average consumer’s valuation
for CSR in this country is sufficiently high. These incentives are mitigated by the multinational firm’s
liability in this country under exports. We also find that the misalignment of preferences between the
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stakeholders of the two countries over the multinational firm’s mode of entry in the foreign country
leaves space for lobbying about the relevant trade/industrial policies, an issue that we leave for future
research.
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